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Abstract: Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and 
theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common 
functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between 
neural structure and cognitive function (e.g., Weiskopf, 2011). In contrast, an integrative 
mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function (e.g., Piccinini 
& Craver, 2011; Povich, 2015). In this paper, I show how model-based cognitive neuroscience 
(MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates the most 
revolutionary elements of the cognitive neuroscience revolution (Boone & Piccinini, 2016). I 
also show how the prominent subset account of functional realization supports the integrative 
mechanistic perspective I take on MBCN and use it to clarify the intralevel and interlevel 
components of integration. 
1. Introduction 
 Autonomist accounts of cognitive science, as I will understand them here, suggest that 
cognitive model building and theory construction (can and/or should) proceed independently of 
findings in neuroscience. Furthermore, according to autonomists, cognitive models, when they 
are explanatory, are not explanatory in virtue of representing neural mechanisms. Common 
functionalist justifications for autonomy have traditionally appealed to multiple realizability and 
the (putative) fact that there are relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive 
function (e.g., Fodor, 1974; Weiskopf, 2011). In contrast, an integrative multifield mechanistic 
2 
 
perspective stresses the mutual constraining of neural structure and cognitive function (e.g., 
Boone & Piccinini, 2016; Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Povich, 2015).  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the mechanistic account of 
scientific explanation and the mechanistic perspective on scientific integration. Then, in Section 
3, I describe model-based cognitive neuroscience (henceforth MBCN; Turner, Forstmann, Love, 
Palmeri, & Van Maanen, 2017), presenting it as an interfield theory (Darden & Maull, 1977). In 
Section 4, I show how MBCN epitomizes multifield mechanistic integration and how a popular 
philosophical account of the realization relation, the subset account, supports and clarifies my 
multifield mechanistic perspective on MBCN.  
2. Mechanistic Explanation and Multifield Mechanistic Integration 
 Multifield mechanistic integration is a relation that holds between scientific fields (and 
between the theories and models therein). An account of that relation was developed as an 
alternative to the traditional intertheoretic reductionist account (Nagel, 1961; Oppenheim & 
Putnam, 1958; Schaffner, 1993; see also Craver, 2005; Darden & Maull, 1977; and Maull, 1977). 
In contrast to that account, the mechanistic perspective provides a more local and descriptively 
adequate conception of levels (Povich & Craver, 2017), according to which levels are levels of 
mechanisms.  
A mechanism, as I will use that term, is any causal system in which parts are organized 
such that they collectively give rise to the behavior or property of the whole in context. A 
mechanism is at a higher mechanistic level than its components, and those components are at 
higher mechanistic levels than their components, and so on, but it makes no sense to say that, in 
general, one kind of thing (e.g., the atom) is at a higher mechanistic level than another (e.g., an 
organism). Mechanistic levels are intelligible only with respect to specific (type or token) 
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mechanisms; that is the sense in which mechanistic levels are local, in contrast to the monolithic 
conception of ontological levels offered by the traditional reductionist account (Povich & Craver, 
2017).1 
 The intertheoretic reduction model saw multifield integration as basically an explanatory 
relationship, explanation being understood according to the deductive-nomological (DN) model 
(see Salmon, 1989 for a survey of influential critiques of the DN model). The mechanistic 
account of multifield integration also sees it as an explanatory relationship, explanation being 
understood according to the mechanistic view of explanation. A mechanistic explanation 
describes the entities, activities, and organization of the mechanism that produces, underlies, or 
maintains the explanandum phenomenon (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000).2 
 Mechanists make (at least) two important normative distinctions (or continua).  The first 
is between mechanism schemata and mechanism sketches (Machamer et al., 2000; Craver, 
2007). A mechanism schema is an abstract description of a type of mechanism, rather than a 
specific token or instance. Details will inevitably be omitted, but, ideally, only details that are 
irrelevant to the functioning of the type of mechanism. Details that are specific to tokens of the 
type can be added as the schema is applied to instances (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 15). 
Mechanism sketches, on the other hand, are incomplete descriptions of (type or token) 
mechanisms that contain black boxes and filler terms (Craver, 2007, p. 113). They are still 
partially explanatory, but they are lacking in relevant detail. More relevant details can be added 
to the model to fill in the gaps. Of course, no model is ever fully complete, just complete enough 
for practical purposes (Craver & Darden, 2013). Idealized models qualify as mechanistic 
explanations to the extent that they capture relevant aspects of mechanisms that produce, 
underlie, or maintain the explanandum phenomena (Povich, forthcoming).  
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 The second normative distinction (or continuum) is between how-possibly and how-
actually models. A how-possibly model describes a merely possible mechanism, whereas a how-
actually model describes the mechanism that actually produces, maintains, or underlies the 
explanandum phenomenon. This distinction is evidential or epistemic: turning a how-possibly 
model into a how-actually model does not require modifying the model itself in any way; it 
requires testing the model (Weiskopf, 2011). Turning a mechanism sketch into a more complete 
mechanism schema, in contrast, requires modifying the model by filling in missing details 
(Craver & Darden, 2013). These details may be at the same mechanistic level as the rest of the 
details in the model, or they may be at a lower mechanistic level. The greater the evidential 
support for a model, the closer it is to a how-actually model. Between how-possibly and how-
actually models is a range of how-plausibly models.  
 Mechanistic explanations, whether they be how-possibly or how-actually models, 
mechanism sketches or schemata, contrast with merely descriptive or phenomenal models. A 
merely descriptive or phenomenal model merely describes the explanandum phenomenon itself, 
usually in a general, concise way. Snell's law is a common example (Craver & Darden, 2013). It 
accurately and compactly describes the relationship between the angle of incidence and the angle 
of refraction when light passes between two media, but it does not explain that relationship. 
 Mechanistic explanations satisfy what are widely considered by mechanists and non-
mechanists alike (e.g., Chirimuuta, 2014; Rice, 2015; Weiskopf, 2011) to be the normative 
constraints on explanation: the ability to answer counterfactual questions about the explanandum 
phenomenon ('what-if-things-had-been-different' questions or ‘w-questions’), and the ability to 
manipulate and control the explanandum phenomenon (Craver, 2007). These norms capture what 
is distinctive about the scientific achievement of explanation, as opposed to other achievements 
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like prediction, description, or categorization. These norms arguably also provide the basis for 
explanatory power. A model is more explanatorily powerful, according to mechanists, when and 
only when it can answer more w-questions about the explanandum phenomenon and afford more 
opportunities for controlling it (Ylikoski & Kuorikoski, 2010). 
The mechanistic account thus sees multifield integration as a process of adding 
constraints on a multilevel mechanism, whether those constraints be at one level or different 
levels. Thus, multifield integration need not always be multilevel integration, since different 
fields can investigate the same mechanism at the same level. Multifield integration is multilevel 
when different fields add different constraints on different levels of the same mechanism. 
Multilevel integration is thus aimed at giving embedded or nested multilevel mechanistic 
explanations of a single explanandum phenomenon, up and down its mechanistic hierarchy. This 
distinction will be important when I discuss the kind of mechanistic integration provided by 
MBCN. Though MBCN has both multilevel/interlevel and intralevel aspects, I will argue that its 
most distinctive achievement is intralevel. 
Multifield integration occurs when findings from different fields mutually constrain our 
understanding of a single mechanism (Craver, 2005, 2007): constraints on its components, their 
causal interactions, and their spatial, temporal, and hierarchical organization. On this view, 
scientific integration is relativized to particular explanandum phenomena; it is thus a local 
process, not one that will or can occur across the whole of science, as on the intertheoretic 
reduction model. Researchers in different scientific fields work together to bridge mechanistic 
levels and bring their unique (personal and field-specific) perspectives to bear on one 
mechanism.  
 One classic example of multifield mechanistic integration in neuroscience is that of the 
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mechanistic explanation of the psychological phenomenon of learning and memory by the 
electrophysiological phenomenon of long-term potentiation (LTP; see Craver, 2005, 2007). 
Craver (2005, 2007) argues that this example of multifield mechanistic integration involved 
interlevel and intralevel components. The discovery of the phenomenon of LTP itself, according 
to Craver (2005), was an example of multifield, intralevel integration: the work of anatomists 
using Golgi staining combined with the work of electrophysiologists using microelectrodes to 
reveal aspects of cells at the same mechanistic level. If electrophysiologists were working with 
psychologists to find the neural correlates of learning and memory, then the discovery of LTP 
would have been an example of multifield, interlevel integration. But that is not what 
electrophysiologists were doing. 
 When researchers started to think that LTP might be a component in a multilevel 
mechanism responsible for learning and memory, then multifield, interlevel integration began 
taking place. This involved not only clarifying the relation of LTP to learning and memory but 
discovering the molecular mechanisms responsible for LTP (Craver, 2005). 
3. Model-based Cognitive Neuroscience 
Model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN) is a burgeoning intersection of cognitive 
neuroscience and cognitive psychology (especially in the form of mathematical psychology) 
(O'Doherty, Hampton, & Kim, 2007; Gläscher & O'Doherty, 2010; Forstmann, Wagenmakers, 
Eichele, Brown, & Serences, 2011; Forstmann & Wagenmakers, 2015; Turner, Van Maanen, & 
Forstmann, 2015; Love, 2015, 2016; Turner et al., 2017; Palmeri, Love, & Turner, 2017). There 
is now an edited book (Forstmann & Wagenmakers, 2015) and special issue of the Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology (2017, issue 76) dedicated to it.  
To make the case that MBCN provides an example of multifield integration, I first need to 
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show that the component disciplines are in fact fields. For this purpose I will use Darden and 
Maull’s (1977) account of fields, according to which “a field is an area of science consisting of 
the following elements: a central problem, a domain consisting of items taken to be facts related 
to that problem, general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as to how the 
problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and, sometimes, but not always, concepts, laws 
and theories which are related to the problem and which attempt to realize the explanatory goals” 
(p. 44). 
It is plausible that cognitive neuroscience is such a field. Its central problem is 
discovering how the brain carries out cognitive tasks; it has a domain of background knowledge 
consisting of items taken to be facts related to that problem (e.g., facts about the structure and 
function of certain brain areas, the neuron doctrine, etc.); it has unique neuroimaging and 
electrophysiological techniques for investigating that problem; and so on.  
It is also plausible that cognitive psychology is a field in Darden and Maull’s sense. It has 
as its central problem explaining how the mind functionally carries out cognitive tasks 
(perception, decision-making, etc.); it has a domain of background knowledge related to that 
problem (e.g., the guiding ideas of the cognitive revolution, such as that the mind possesses 
mental representations [in some sense I will not elaborate] or processes information [in some 
sense I will not elaborate]); it has unique experimental methods (behavioral tasks, protocols, and 
“paradigms”) for investigating that problem; and so on. Investigators in MBCN typically focus 
on mathematical psychology, understood by them to mean that part of cognitive psychology that 
constructs formal models of cognition, because formal cognitive models are more easily and 
fruitfully combined with neuroimaging and electrophysiological data.3 
According to Darden and Maull (1977, p. 49), an interfield theory makes explicit and 
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explains relations between fields. For my purposes, the most relevant such relation that might be 
the focus of an interfield theory is the following: “A field may investigate the structure of entities 
or processes, the function of which is investigated in another field” (Ibid.). This is how we 
should think of the relation between the fields of cognitive neuroscience and cognitive 
psychology. My account of MBCN also fits with Darden and Maull’s account of when an 
interfield theory is likely to be generated: “In brief, an interfield theory is likely to be generated 
when background knowledge indicates that relations already exist between the fields, when the 
fields share an interest in explaining different aspects of the same phenomenon, and when 
questions arise about that phenomenon within a field which cannot be answered with the 
techniques and concepts of that field” (p. 49). MBCN was generated for precisely these reasons, 
as I explain below. 
The component fields of MBCN have historically been distinct. Cognitive psychologists 
construct (sometimes formal) models of cognition that posit representations and computational 
processes over them, and they test these cognitive models using behavioral data. Cognitive 
neuroscientists rely on empirical measurements of neural activity and on statistical models that 
link that activity to cognitive processes and behavior. However, rarely are these links connected 
to hypothesized computations of a cognitive model. Because of this neglect of cognitive models, 
cognitive neuroscience often only tells us the brain areas the activity of which is implicated in or 
predictive of a cognitive process or behavior.4 Without a model, cognitive neuroscience is silent 
on how or why a specific brain area produces a cognitive process or behavior (Turner et al., 
2017; Palmeri et al., 2017). In Marrian terms (Marr 1982), cognitive psychologists have been 
theorizing at the computational and algorithmic levels, while cognitive neuroscientists have been 
theorizing at the implementational level. But without a cognitive model to guide them, cognitive 
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neuroscientists are blind to what computations and algorithms might actually be implemented 
(Ibid.; Love, 2015). Bridging Marr’s levels has been called the integration problem by MBCN 
investigators (Turner, Rodriguez, Norcia, McClure, & Steyvers, 2016, p. 21; Turner et al., 2017, 
p. 66).5 
 It is the explicit goal of MBCN to solve the integration problem (Love, 2016; Turner et 
al., 2017; Palmeri et al., 2017). This problem motivated the development of new theoretical and 
statistical frameworks that attempt to bridge mathematical psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience, the frameworks that define MBCN. The development of these new theoretical and 
statistical frameworks fits nicely with Darden and Maull’s claim that an interfield theory is likely 
to be generated when questions arise about a phenomenon within a field which cannot be 
answered with the techniques and concepts of that field. It is also clearly true that background 
knowledge indicated that relations already exist between cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience and that these fields share an interest in explaining different aspects of the same 
phenomena. 
Turner, Forstmann, Love, Palmeri, and Van Maanen (2017, p. 66) helpfully distinguish 
between three categories of statistical framework for MBCN: those that (1) use neural data to 
constrain a cognitive model, (2) use a cognitive model to predict neural data, and (3) model both 
neural and behavioral data simultaneously. Let us refer to the first category as “neural constraint 
approaches,” the second category as “neural prediction approaches,” and the third category as 
“simultaneous approaches”. There are subcategories within each kind of approach that will be 
explained below. 
Note that in neural and cognitive model building, respectively, there are neural data (e.g., 
neuroimaging data or neurophysiological recordings) that are predicted by parameters of a neural 
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model (e.g., the slope in a general linear model), and there are behavioral data (e.g., reaction or 
response times) that are predicted by parameters of a cognitive model (e.g., the average rate of 
evidence accumulation or drift rate of a diffusion decision model of perceptual decision making). 
The relations between different kinds of datum and parameter help define each statistical 
framework. I will use the term “cognitive model” synonymously with Turner et al.’s term 
“behavioral model”. I briefly describe each framework in turn. 
 First, there are neural constraint approaches, one of which Turner et al. (2017, p. 68) call 
the “theoretical approach”. In the theoretical approach, neural considerations inspire the form of 
a cognitive model. The most prominent example of the theoretical approach is connectionism, 
where the form of models is intended to approach some level of biological realism, although in 
the theoretical approach, there is no mathematical link between the neural data and the cognitive 
model’s architecture or parameters. The theoretical approach is not as prominent as other 
approaches in modern MBCN research, at least partly to avoid philosophical and theoretical 
questions about the extent to which the implementational level needs to be reflected in the 
algorithmic and computational levels (Ibid., 69). 
The second kind of neural constraint approach is called the “two-stage behavioral 
approach” (Ibid.). In this approach, neural data are used to set neural model parameters and then 
some of the cognitive model parameters are replaced by some of the neural parameters. Wong 
and Wang’s (2006) recurrent neural network model of perceptual decision making is an instance 
of the two-stage behavioral approach. Many of the parameters of that model are set by reference 
to neural parameters. Approaches like this are also not quite as prominent as others in modern 
MBCN research at least partly because they are difficult to simulate (Turner et al., 2017, p. 69).  
The last neural constraint approach is the direct input approach (Turner et al., 2017). This 
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approach is like to the two-stage behavioral approach, but instead of replacing some of the 
cognitive model parameters with neural parameters (which are set by neural data), some of the 
cognitive model parameters are set directly by the neural data. For example, Palmeri, Schall, and 
Logan (2015) used neurophysiological data to set the drift rate parameter of a diffusion-type 
model of perceptual decision making (Turner et al., 2017).  
 Then there are neural prediction approaches, one of which is the latent input approach 
(Turner et al., 2017, p. 70). This is the approach that has been used under the heading “model-
based fMRI” (O'Doherty et al., 2007; Gläscher & O'Doherty, 2010; Davis, Love, & Preston, 
2012; Povich, 2015) though, as Turner et al. note (2017, p. 70), it could be used with any kind of 
neural data, not just fMRI. In this approach, parameters of a cognitive model are used to generate 
predicted neural data. These predicted neural data are regressed against observed neural data to 
look for correlations. This approach can be used to discriminate between competing, equally 
behaviorally confirmed cognitive models (Mack, Preston, & Love, 2013). For example, Davis, 
Love, and Preston (2012) used a latent input approach to discriminate between two competing 
cognitive models of object categorization, SUSTAIN and ALCOVE.6 Each model predicts 
different changes in recognition strength and error correction across trials. Davis et al. found that 
both of SUSTAIN’s predicted hemodynamic response functions (HRFs) for recognition strength 
and error correction were significantly correlated with observed HRFs, whereas only ALCOVE’s 
predicted HRF for error correction was significantly correlated with observed HRFs.  
The second kind of neural prediction approach is the two-stage neural approach (Turner 
et al., 2017, p. 70). The two-stage neural approach is like the latent input approach, but cognitive 
model parameters are used to predict neural data directly. In other words, instead of using 
cognitive model parameters to generate predicted neural data, which are then regressed against 
12 
 
observed neural data, cognitive model parameters are themselves regressed against observed 
neural data. For example, Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, Rushworth (2007) found that the learning 
rate in a Bayesian model was predictive of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activation (Turner et 
al., 2017, p. 71). 
 Finally, there are simultaneous modeling approaches, such as the increasingly popular 
joint modeling approach (Turner et al., 2017, p. 72; see also Turner et al., 2013; Turner, 2015; 
Turner et al., 2015; Love, 2016; and Palestro et al., 2018). In this approach, the parameters of 
neural models and the parameters of cognitive models are simultaneously related through a set of 
hyperparameters, allowing for mutual constraint on all model parameters (Turner et al., 2015, p. 
315). Associated with a cognitive model is a probability distribution representing the probability 
of the behavioral data given the cognitive model parameters. Similarly, associated with a neural 
model is a probability density function representing the probability of the neural data given the 
neural model parameters (Turner, 2015, p. 201). The hyperparameters enforce a joint distribution 
of the parameters in the cognitive and neural models.7 The kind of joint distribution is up to the 
modeler. One could, for example, assume that the parameters follow a multivariate normal 
distribution. This allows predictions to be made about a particular subject’s behavioral data given 
their neural data and vice versa. Turner, Rodriguez, Norcia, McClure, and Steyvers (2016) 
recently performed a joint modeling study combining a Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA; a 
model of intertemporal choice) with both fMRI and EEG data. They were able to show that LBA 
combined with both fMRI and EEG data provides better predictions of behavioral data than LBA 
alone and LBA with either fMRI or EEG data alone (see also Love, 2016).  
The second kind of simultaneous modeling approach is the integrative approach (Turner 
et al., 2017, p. 73; see also Palestro et al., 2018). The integrative approach is like the joint 
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modeling approach except that hyperparameters do not connect the parameters of the cognitive 
and neural models. Instead, just one set of parameters predicts both the behavioral data and the 
neural data. The integrative approach is very difficult technically to implement and 
computationally intensive (Ibid.). It also requires strong commitments about what cognitive 
processes are involved and the brain areas that implement them (Ibid.). According to Turner et al. 
(2017, p. 73), some applications of the cognitive architecture ACT-R have aimed to implement 
this approach (Borst & Anderson, 2013, 2017), although these applications sometimes more 
closely resemble the latent input approach. Furthermore, according to Palestro et al. (2018, p. 
23), the most accessible implementations of the integrative approach can be viewed simply as 
instances of the two-stage behavioral approach (which they call the “directed approach”). 
MBCN represents a major step forward in solving the integration problem, yet its 
analyses have all been correlational so far. As such, we must be careful not to overstate what 
such analyses show. They do not, for example, show that any given cognitive model is 
implemented in the brain, though they provide steps for reaching that conclusion eventually. 
Correlations between parameters of cognitive models and neuroimaging or neural recording data 
may provide some, but not much, evidence that the correlated brain region implements the 
representation or performs the computation specified by the cognitive model parameter. Ritchie, 
Kaplan, and Klein’s (2017; see also Carlson, Goddard, Kaplan, Klein, & Ritchie, 2018) critique 
of multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) and neural decoding algorithms echoes similar 
concerns. To establish that specific neural activity implements a specific computation, the usual 
causal interventions and manipulations are required, such as activation and inhibition 
experiments (Craver, 2007; Thomson & Piccinini, 2018). Advances in optogenetics (Deisseroth, 
2011) and designer receptors exclusively activated by designer drugs (DREADDs) (Roth, 2016) 
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have greatly increased the specificity of such causal interventions. 
4. MBCN Exemplifies Multifield Mechanistic Integration 
Although MBCN does not, and currently cannot, demonstrate which specific neural 
mechanisms underlie a cognitive process, it does place constraints on what the neural mechanism 
might be. The mutual constraining of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience that 
characterizes MBCN is definitive of multifield mechanistic integration. Each of the statistical 
frameworks and examples of them described above represents a different way of achieving that 
mutual constraint.  
Researchers in MBCN are quite explicit that their studies illustrate mutual constraint and 
that that is the intended goal of the development of these new statistical frameworks. For 
example, Turner et al. (2017, pp. 66-68) write that the category of neural constraint approaches 
“uses neural data as auxiliary information that guides or constrains a behavioral model. … [T]he 
neural data are considered important, but only in the sense that they inform the mechanisms in 
the behavioral model”. For Forstmann and Wagenmakers (2015, p. 153), the goals of MBCN are 
to show “how mathematical models can advance cognitive neuroscience, and how cognitive 
neuroscience can provide constraint for mathematical models”. According to Palmeri, Love, and 
Turner (2017, p. 60), “One [of the factors that drove the development of MBCN] was the 
recognition on the part of cognitive modelers and mathematical psychologists interested in 
understanding the mechanisms that brain data is simply additional data by which to constrain and 
contrast models”. Turner, Van Maanen, and Forstmann (2015, pp. 331-332) write that “our goal 
was to develop a model that could use prestimulus measures of brain activity to better constrain 
and inform the mechanisms assumed by a cognitive model of choice response time”. Quotations 
such as these are replete in MBCN studies. 
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By providing mutual constraint from different scientific fields on the mechanisms that 
underlie and are responsible for cognitive processes, MBCN represents multifield mechanistic 
integration. This integration has multilevel and intralevel aspects. Building cognitive models that 
explain cognitive processes is a multilevel endeavor: the cognitive model posits representations 
and computational processes that are components of a mechanism responsible for the 
explanandum phenomenon.8 Cognitive modeling is the province of cognitive psychology, a 
component field of MBCN. Finding implementations of those representations and computational 
processes is an intralevel endeavor. For example, in the study mentioned above (Davis, Love, 
and Preston, 2012), statistically significant correlations were found between SUSTAIN’s 
recognition strength parameter and medial temporal lobe (MTL) regions (call this set of regions 
“the MTL network”). The relation between the representations and computations SUSTAIN 
posits and what SUSTAIN is meant to explain (i.e., object categorization) is multilevel – those 
representations are components of a mechanism responsible for object recognition. But the 
representation of recognition strength and the neural activity that implements it are not at 
different mechanistic levels. MBCN realizes (or at least approximates) the mechanistic ideal of 
explanation by helping to identify potential realizers for the components of cognitive models that 
are themselves mechanistic explanations of some cognitive capacity. That is, via cognitive 
models, MBCN identifies potential components of mechanisms for cognitive capacities. Testing 
whether these potential mechanistic components really are components – whether these potential 
realizers really are realizers – requires causal experiment. 
It is true generally that the representations and computational processes over them that 
are posited by a cognitive model and the neural mechanisms that implement them are not at 
different mechanistic levels. Marr’s levels are levels of realization, description, or analysis, not 
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mechanistic levels (Povich & Craver, 2017). Mechanistic levels are compositional, and the 
implementational level is not literally a part or component of the algorithmic level or 
computational level. Similarly, functional roles and the structures that play them are not at 
different mechanistic levels. This is easiest to see if we consider a concrete account of the 
realization relation. 
4.1. Flat Realization and Intralevel Mechanistic Integration 
 A philosophical account of the realization relation aims to explicate the relation that holds 
when one thing (object, property, set of properties, etc.) is realized by another (object, property, 
set of properties, etc.; the relata of the realization relation are themselves controversial). This is 
the asymmetric relation that holds between functional roles and the structures that play them. It is 
also the relation that holds between Marr’s levels. The two most prominent philosophical 
accounts of realization are the “flat” (i.e., intralevel) subset account (Kim, 1998; Polger & 
Shapiro, 2008; Shoemaker, 2007) and the dimensioned (i.e., interlevel) account (Gillett, 2002a, 
2002b).  
 According to a flat account of realization, realizee and realizer are not at different 
mechanistic levels. A realizer is just something that meets the criteria that serve to identify 
instances of the realizee (Polger & Shapiro, 2008, p. 217). In metaphysical terms, this is usually 
cashed out in terms of “higher-level properties”: the realizee is the property of having some 
property that plays a specific functional role and the realizer plays that functional role. Thus, to 
use an old example, being in pain is possessing the property of having some property that plays 
the functional role of pain and the firing of C-fibers plays that role.9 Shoemaker (2007) has 
cashed this out in different metaphysical terms.10 On his subset account of realization, property P 
realizes property Q if and only if the causal powers conferred by Q are a subset of causal powers 
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conferred by P. According to Shoemaker, this is what it means, metaphysically speaking, to say 
that P plays the functional Q-role. P may do things that Q does not do (hence the appeal to 
subsets, rather than identity, of causal powers), but it does everything that Q does and, so, counts 
as playing the functional role of Q. 
 According to the dimensioned account (Gillett, 2002a, 2002b), the realization relation is 
an interlevel relation. It is a relation that holds between a property of an object and the properties 
of its parts. Specifically, a collection of properties P1-Pn of constituents of an object realize 
property G in that object if and only if the causal powers conferred by G to that object are 
conferred in virtue of the causal powers conferred by P1-Pn. For example, the hardness of a 
diamond is realized by the bonding properties of its atoms because the powers conferred by 
hardness to the diamond are conferred in virtue of the causal powers conferred by the bonding 
properties of its atoms (Ibid.). 
 Although these accounts of realization have generated heated debate (Gillett, 2002a, 
2002b; Polger & Shapiro, 2008; Polger, 2004; Shapiro, 2004), Endicott (2011) helpfully suggests 
that they are not competing accounts. He distinguishes between the 'what' and the 'how' of 
realization. The intralevel subset account is an account of the former, and the interlevel 
dimensioned account is an account of the latter. Dimensioned realization is essentially 
mechanistic explanation – it explains how a structure is able to perform some function in virtue 
of the properties of its parts and their organization. In contrast, the subset view says in virtue of 
what that structure counts as performing some function in the first place. Thus, the subset view 
identifies what structure realizes some function and the dimensioned account shows how it 
realizes that function.11 
To put this abstract metaphysics in the context of MBCN, MBCN provides suggestive 
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evidence that the causal powers associated with recognition strength in SUSTAIN are a subset of 
the causal powers of the MTL network. MBCN thus provides suggestive evidence about what in 
the brain realizes recognition strength. The flat subset account adequately describes the relation 
between cognitive model parameters (and representations, computations, etc.) and the neural 
areas that might realize them.12 Thus, the novel statistical frameworks distinctive of MBCN 
specifically allow a form of intralevel integration,13 though, as I explained earlier, the brain 
regions identified are components of mechanisms for cognitive capacities. The mechanistic 
multifield integration of MBCN is thus a complex interplay of intralevel and interlevel 
integrations.  
How does my argument square with claims that MBCN “provides insight into ‘how’ a 
particular cognitive function might be implemented in the brain, not only ‘where’ it is 
implemented” (O’Doherty et al., 2007, p. 39) and that traditional non-model-based cognitive 
neuroscience “can tell us which brain regions are predictive of a particular behavior and even by 
how much, but they say nothing about neither how nor why particular brain regions produce said 
behavior” (Turner et al., 2017, p. 66; emphasis in original)? Here it is important to note that the 
use of a cognitive model is what provides insight into the ‘how’ and ‘why’. The cognitive model 
has components and they and their interactions explain how some cognitive ability is performed. 
Those cognitive model components can be mapped onto brain regions. In that way, MBCN can 
provide insight into how the cognitive ability is performed, but not how the cognitive model 
components are implemented. It provides evidence about what implements the cognitive model 
components. To continue with my previous example, by identifying the MTL network as a 
potential realizer for recognition strength, MBCN can provide insight into how object 
categorization is performed, but it has not provided any insight into how the MTL network 
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realizes recognition strength. 
The subset view of realization also makes explicit why adding implementational details 
does not constitute interlevel mechanistic integration: to add implementational details is to 
extend the set of causal powers possessed at a single mechanistic level beyond the set picked out 
by a functional concept. The causal powers contained in the proper superset (i.e., the causal 
powers in the superset not contained in the subset), while they may be functionally irrelevant, 
can often be used to identify the potential realizer. For example, SUSTAIN’s concept of 
recognition strength picks out certain causal powers, and the concept MTL network picks out 
certain causal powers. The former are a subset of the latter. That is what it means for the MTL 
network to play the recognition strength role. The causal powers in the proper superset include 
all those powers of the MTL network that are irrelevant to it playing the recognition strength 
role. However, we can often use those powers (e.g., the power to look a certain way in a 
microscope or neuroimager) to identify the region on which we should intervene to test the 
hypothesis that it has the causal powers associated with recognition strength.14 Interestingly, 
while it is unlikely that MBCN researchers have thought about multifield integration using these 
concepts, they come close to endorsing a view similar to the one just presented when they write, 
“The central assumption of these analyses is that information obtained from either source of data 
[neural or behavioral] can tell a similar story – albeit in different languages – about some aspect 
of cognition, and the integration of the these measures assimilates the differences in languages 
across data modalities” (Turner et al., 2017, p. 66). Here I have presented a philosophical defense 
and elaboration of that claim. 
5. Conclusion 
  What is revolutionary about cognitive neuroscience is its rejection of the traditional 
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cognitive science view of autonomous metaphysical and methodological levels: 
functional/cognitive/computational vs. neural/mechanistic/implementation (Boone & Piccinini, 
2016).15 As a prime example of the integrative multifield mechanistic perspective with the 
explicit aim of linking cognitive models to the brain, MBCN thus concentrates the most 
revolutionary elements of cognitive neuroscience. It is the vanguard of the cognitive 
neuroscience revolution. It has invented new statistical frameworks that allow cognitive 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience mutually to constrain each other. This multifield 
mechanistic integration has interlevel and intralevel components. The interlevel component is 
illustrated by cognitive modeling and the intralevel component is illustrated by efforts to find 
implementations of those cognitive models. The latter is the distinctive goal of the new statistical 
frameworks of MBCN. 
Endnotes 
1. Eronen (2015) argues that the main ideas of mechanists can be cashed out in a deflationary 
sense of levels that simply combines composition and scale. I think it’s fine if one wants to cash 
out my claims similarly. For example, later I argue that, according to the mechanistic sense of 
level, a structure and the function it performs are not at different levels; but this is true in 
Eronen’s deflationary sense of level too. Eronen also argues that Craver’s same-level criterion, 
which gives a sufficient condition for sameness of mechanistic level, leads to a branching 
structure of levels that makes it difficult to align scientific models. However, Povich and Craver 
basically accept Eronen’s critique of this criterion. After arguing that there is only a necessary 
condition for sameness of mechanistic level, they write: “But one might just as easily say on this 
basis that sameness of level has no deep conceptual significance for mechanistic levels. … For 
some, this is tantamount to abandoning the idea of levels (e.g., Eronen 2015). We see our account 
21 
 
rather as a distillate of the ordinary scientific concept, an extraction of an explanatorily and 
metaphysically central idea, leaving behind as residue the problematic commitments inherent in 
our inchoate, folk talk of ‘levels’” (Povich & Craver, 2017, p. 188). I thank the editors for 
pressing me to clarify this. 
2. Sometimes causal-etiological and contextual explanations are also considered species of 
mechanistic explanation (Bechtel, 2011). I will not be concerned with those here. 
3. As the editors point out, it is not as plausible that mathematical psychology is itself a distinct 
field in Darden and Maull’s sense. I thank them for helping me clarify this section. 
4. An early exception (and an early refutation of Coltheart, 2006) that nicely illustrates multifield 
integration is Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, and Raichle’s (1988) PET study of single-word 
processing. In that study, PET data were used as additional constraints on cognitive models of 
lexical processing. Their results favored a parallel, rather than serial, processing model. 
5. The development MBCN arguably fits nicely with Bickle’s (2016) account of tool-driven 
scientific revolution. 
6. These models are the topic of Weiskopf’s (2011) criticisms of mechanistic explanation. See 
Povich (2015) for a response. 
7. Because this procedure treats cognitive and neural model parameters as covariates, Palestro et 
al. (2018) call it the “covariation approach” to joint modeling and use “joint modeling” as a 
broader term that includes the two-stage behavioral approach (which they call the “directed 
approach”) and the integrative approach, which I discuss next. 
8. The claim that cognitive models provide mechanistic explanations is controversial. For a 
defense of it, see Piccinini & Craver (2011) and Povich (2015). 
9. This talk of properties and properties of having properties is meant to accommodate multiple 
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realizability. If pain is multiply realizable, it cannot be strictly identified with, for example, C-
fibers firing. Appealing to “higher-level” properties of having properties is supposed to respect 
this intuition while providing a way to remain metaphysically materialist. 
10. Or he uses the same metaphysical terms but cashes out “higher-level properties” in a specific 
way (see Shoemaker, 2007). 
11. Piccinini and Maley (2014) appear confusingly to run the what and the how together in their 
account.  
12. The subset view thus aligns nicely with the idea that “levels of realization” are levels of 
abstraction, an idea espoused by earlier mechanists (Bechtel & Mundale, 1999). Computational 
models are more abstract descriptions and neural models are less abstract descriptions of the 
same reality. 
13. Boone & Piccinini (2016) mistakenly characterize MBCN’s mechanistic integration as 
exclusively multilevel, but the kind of integration on which MBCN is distinctively focused is 
intralevel. 
14. In other words, it is no part of the function of recognition strength to look a certain way to a 
neuroscientist, though a neuroscientist can only find a potential realizer of recognition strength 
by its effect on neuroimaging or electrophysiological recording devices, after statistical analysis. 
I suspect this is a general feature of the structure-function relation, sans any structures whose 
function just is to be perceived by us in a certain way. For example, it is no part of the function 
of a corkscrew to look a certain way to me, though that is how I find one when I open the kitchen 
drawer. Actually to test whether what looks like a corkscrew is a corkscrew, I intervene on 
relevant properties. I do not wish here to defend this more general claim though – I only wish to 
claim that irrelevant properties can be and sometimes are used to find potential realizers. 
23 
 
Actually testing whether they are realizers requires intervening on (putatively) relevant 
properties. 
15. The extent to which autonomy held sway among early working cognitive scientists can be 
debated. For example, Marr, although he approached his three levels in a relatively top-down 
fashion, seems to have been against autonomy in the sense at issue. However, autonomy was 
certainly present in, for example, Pylyshyn (1984), who was influenced by Fodor. See also the 
relevant references listed by Boone and Piccinini (2016, p. 1513). Autonomy is also how “early 
cognitive science” is portrayed in contemporary cognitive science textbooks, such as Bermudez’s 
(2014, section 3.1) influential textbook. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me here. 
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